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RETRIBUTIVISM, CONSEQUENTIALISM, AND THE RISK 
OF PUNISHING THE INNOCENT: 
THE TROUBLESOME CASE OF PROXY CRIMES  
– Piotr Bystranowski – 
Abstract. This paper discusses differences between two major schools in philosophy of criminal 
law, retributivism and consequentialism, with regard to the risk of (unintentionally) punishing the 
innocent. As it is argued, the main point of departure between these two camps in this respect lies 
in their attitude towards the high evidentiary threshold in a criminal trial: while retributivism se-
ems to strongly support setting this standard high, consequentialists may find it desirable to relax 
it in some cases. This discussion is set in the context of proxy criminalization, i.e. a situation, in 
which some suspicious behaviour (i.e. behaviour that is only in some correlation with wrongful 
conduct, while not being substantially wrongful in itself) is criminalized. Since proxy criminaliza-
tion may be understood as an effective lowering of the evidentiary threshold, its employment is 
justifiable from the consequentialist perspective, while being highly problematic for the retribu-
tivists. 
Keywords: philosophy of criminal law, retributivism, consequentialism, proxy crimes, evidentiary 
threshold. 
1. Introduction1 
According to the standard retributivist approach to criminal law, punish-
ment should be imposed on the guilty, and only on the guilty, according to what 
they deserve. From that, it follows that no innocent individual should be pun-
ished, nor should any guilty individual be punished more than she deserves. On 
the other hand, consequentialism traditionally argues that criminal law should dis-
tribute punishment in a way that maximizes some desirable consequences, such as 
social welfare.  
As it has been argued many times by the proponents of retributivism, a ma-
jor point of departure between these two approaches which dominate the philoso-
phy of criminal law lies in their attitude towards the possibility of knowingly pun-
                                                 
1 The research was supported by a grant no. 2015/17/B/HS1/02279 funded by the National Sci-
ence Centre, Poland.  
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ishing the innocent. While retributivism unconditionally prohibits knowingly im-
posing punishment on an innocent individual, consequentialism is supposed to 
lack such a safeguard, which puts it at odds with common moral intuitions. A typ-
ical retributivist argument of this kind involves an invented case in which a law 
enforcer faces a choice between framing an innocent individual or to risk trigger-
ing a lynching in which many people are likely to be killed.2 A utilitarian law 
enforcer, retributivists claim, would choose to frame the innocent individual 
whenever the harm caused by the wrongful conviction is smaller than the ex-
pected detrimental consequences of the riot. If true, this argument would be most 
damaging to the moral legitimacy of consequentialism in criminal law: a move-
ment that was historically born as a protest against the abuse of discretion in the 
infliction of punishment would turn out to allow one to intentionally punish 
the innocent, an outcome morally unacceptable for most consequentialists them-
selves.3  
In reply, consequentialists use one of two standard counterarguments. First, 
a law enforcer that would choose to frame the innocent individual in such a case 
would be, at best, a short-sighted consequentialist. A more thorough consequential-
ist analysis would easily show that, in the long run, the bad consequences of al-
lowing the punishment of innocents (such as the possibility of abuse of power, or 
a decrease in the legitimacy of the legal system, resulting in the reduced willing-
ness to comply with the law and cooperate with law enforcers and so on) would 
be larger than any possible short-term benefits.4 Secondly, and more fundamental-
ly, consequentialists argue that cases of this kind are excessively stylised, fanciful, 
and are not likely to ever happen in the actual world.5 Thus, even if the theoretical 
possibility of consequentialism recommending the conviction of the innocent is of 
some interest for academic moral philosophy, it lacks any relevance in discussions 
on real-word criminal law policy.  
However, if we agree that consequentialism is highly unlikely to recom-
mend that one knowingly convict the innocent, this does not end the discussion. 
This is because it may be argued that retributivism and consequentialism give dif-
ferent recommendations when it comes to the issue of managing the risk of unin-
tentional wrongful convictions. Due to the inevitable errors in the operations of the 
                                                 
2 See Kaplow, Shavell (2002) for a review and critical discussion. See also Carritt (1947) and 
Smilansky (1990). 
3 Rawls (1955). 
4 Kaplow, Shavell (2002). 
5 Smilansky (1990). 
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police and the judicial system, this risk can hardly be eliminated.6 In modern legal 
systems, this risk is mitigated by the introduction of high evidentiary threshold in 
criminal trial. Typically, the criminal law requires that, in order to convict the de-
fendant, the court has to be almost certain with regard to his guilt (or, as it is 
phrased in Anglo-American law, the guilt has to be proved ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’). Thus, modern law usually strikes the trade-off between wrongful convic-
tions and wrongful acquittals by putting much more weight on minimizing the 
former,7 i.e. setting a high evidentiary threshold for conviction.8  
As it has been recently argued in the literature (and as it will be presented 
in this paper), retributivism, because of its strong aversion towards punishing the 
innocent, may provide unequivocal support for the uniformly high evidentiary 
threshold in criminal law. In contrast, consequentialism can support some relaxa-
tion of this high standard of proof in cases where it may be expected to generate 
overall better consequences.9  
This difference between retributivism and consequentialism with regard to 
the desirable evidentiary threshold has some practically important consequences. 
The one to be examined in detail in this paper is the assessment of proxy criminali-
zation, i.e. the criminalization of conduct that is assumed to be suspicious (that is, to 
be in a significant correlation with some other wrongful behaviour) even if it is not 
particularly wrongful in itself. As it will be pointed out in this paper, proxy crimi-
nalization is effectively a tool for lowering the evidentiary threshold and thus it 
can be, in principle, justified within the consequentialist framework while remain-
ing possibly inconsistent with retributivist views. Since proxy criminalization is 
quite persistent in contemporary legal systems, such a conclusion would imply 
that consequentialism may be more descriptively accurate with regard to the actu-
al operation of modern systems of criminal justice.  
Proxy criminalization, despite its seemingly tremendous practical im-
portance, has not yet received much attention in philosophical literature. This pa-
per is the first, to my knowledge, to aim at assessing the moral status of proxy 
crimes from both retributivist and consequentialist perspectives. As it will be ar-
                                                 
6 Alexander (1983). 
7 It is often expressed by the maxim saying that it is better that n guilty persons escape than that 
one innocent suffer, where   ≥  . However, there has been no consensus on what the right value of 
n is, with proposed values historically ranging from 1 (Voltaire) to 10 (Blackstone) to 1000 (Moses 
Maimonides). See Epps (2015) for an overview and discussion. 
8 From a more retributivist perspective, one may say that by setting the evidentiary threshold the 
society decides what ratio of false convictions is the maximal price we are willing to pay for 
the operation of the criminal justice system.  
9 Smilansky (1990). 
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gued, proxy crimes are inconsistent with what appears to be the most plausible 
interpretation of retributivism, which may explain some controversies (including 
those in case law) surrounding actual instances of proxy crimes. I will suggest that 
this outcome may result from the fact that many retributivists focus on minimiz-
ing the ‘particular’ risk of punishing the innocent while ignoring the ‘global’ risk. 
Even though in this paper I do not side with any of the two analysed schools of 
thought, I would find such an implication of retributivism to be a bit cumbersome. 
2. Retributivism, consequentialism, and the evidentiary threshold in a criminal trial 
Whether retributivism provides unequivocal support for the high eviden-
tiary threshold is, however, a somewhat more difficult question than suggested in 
the previous section. Let us once again note that the retributivist philosophy of 
punishment is generally based on the statement that the punishment should be 
imposed on the guilty (and only on the guilty) according to what they deserve.10 
The notion of desert (‘what they deserve’) is notoriously hard to define and its in-
terpretation varies largely across retributivist theories. However, many retributiv-
ists would agree that the punishment should be proportional to the offender’s 
‘blameworthiness’, which in turn is determined by the ‘wrongfulness’ of the act 
and the degree of ‘blame’ attributable to the offender.  
Basic retributivism as presented here gives two recommendations: the state 
should (1) refrain from punishing innocents and (2) punish the guilty as they de-
serve it.11 Setting a high evidentiary threshold facilitates the achievement goal (1) 
at the cost, however, of goal (2). Therefore, basic retributivism is not able to pro-
vide us with the desirable ratio of false convictions to false acquittals, at least as 
long as we have not specified a desirable trade-off between goals (1) and (2). 
Since basic retributivism so-understood seems to be unable to give any jus-
tification for the high evidentiary threshold, we need to consider more nuanced 
retributivist theories. The most promising option is negative retributivism, which 
claims only that the state must neither punish innocents nor punish the guilty 
more than they deserve; but it does not have any moral obligation to punish all 
offenders.12 Negative retributivism is shared mostly by philosophers who believe 
that, in principle, the punishment should be distributed in a way that facilitates 
                                                 
10 Robinson (2008); Duff, Hoskins (2017). 
11 Duff, Hoskins (2017). 
12 Ibidem. Notice that negative retributivism, so defined, is a position with regard to the distribu-
tion of punishment, not with regard to the justification of punishment, which may remain purely 
retributivist. 
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the achievement of some consequentialist aims (first of all, limiting the level of 
crime) but who, at the same time, are afraid that pure consequentialism may lead 
to morally unacceptable results.13 Thus, negative retributivism is supposed to 
work as a side-constraint: the punishment is to be applied in accordance with 
some consequentialist criteria as long as these criteria do not lead us to punishing 
innocents or punishing the guilty too harshly. 
As long as it seems to just put more weight on avoiding wrongful convic-
tions than wrongful acquittals, negative retributivism appears to provide a better 
argument in favour of high evidentiary threshold. However, before we agree with 
that, we have to deal with yet another problem: is negative retributivism, under-
stood as prohibiting the application of punishment to innocents under any cir-
cumstances, tenable? Ultimately, any criminal law system (bar the hardly conceiv-
able one in which the standard of proof requires absolute certainty) unavoidably 
leads to some wrongful convictions, as long as it is not possible to totally get rid of 
factual mistakes.14 Thus, in this respect there is nothing qualitatively specific about 
a legal system with a relaxed evidentiary threshold below the beyond a reasonable 
doubt (BARD) standard: it would fail to satisfy the criterion of negative retributiv-
ism exactly as any feasible criminal law system does.  
However, this is not that much of a problem if we notice that negative re-
tributivists seem to understand retributivist side-constraints to be of agent-relative 
nature.15 Thus, what constitutes a fundamental moral wrong is not the fact that the 
criminal justice system in general produces some wrongful convictions but rather 
a particular setting in which the court convicts the defendant despite some 
non-negligible uncertainty with regard to her guilt. The negative retributivist 
should not worry much that the operation of criminal justice in general may cause 
some harm to innocents, just as he does not worry much that virtually any human 
activity or social institution may cause some harm to third parties. But, on the other 
hand, being punished means being condemned for committing a wrong, negative 
retributivists say, thus there is an agent-relative norm prohibiting imposing pun-
ishment without having knowledge that the defendant is guilty.16 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Hart (1968). 
14 Alexander (1983). 
15 Moore (1997): 155: “[t]he ‘deontological’ or ‘agent-relative’ retributivist regards the act of punish-
ing the guilty as categorically demanded on each occasion, considered separately.” 
16 This is to say that, according to many retributivists, ‘knowledge’ (understood as ‘justified or 
well-founded true belief’) of the defendant’s guilt is a necessary condition for imposing condemna-
tion associated with criminal punishment, see Duff et al. (2007): 89–91 (the issue of whether the 
epistemological definition of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’ can be applied in this context 
without any qualifications has not been analysed in the literature. I find it somewhat problematic 
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It is important not to misread retributivist accounts as simply putting more 
weight on avoiding false convictions. In contrast to the consequentialists, who ba-
sically see the evidentiary threshold as a tool for striking a socially-desirable trade-
off between Type 1/Type 2 errors,17 retributivists tend to treat the BARD standard 
as a ‘directly morally-grounded principle’,18 having an intrinsic moral value inde-
pendent of any instrumental considerations. According to Patrick Tomlin, the high 
evidentiary threshold may be directly grounded by affirming two moral princi-
ples: the objective one (“punishment is only appropriately directed toward those 
who have performed punishment-worthy wrongs and have yet to receive the ap-
propriate punishment”) and the subjective one (“punishment should only be di-
rected toward those who we are sure beyond any reasonable doubt fall into the 
category described in [the objective principle]”). While the first principle seems to 
be acceptable for anybody who is not a thorough consequentialist, acknowledging 
the second, subjective, principle (and, subsequently, treating the BARD standard 
as a directly morally grounded principle) depends on the way we decide to deal 
with our epistemic limitations.19 As should be visible from what we have dis-
cussed above, negative retributivists have no problems with acknowledging the 
subjective principle, because of their strong aversion to striking any explicit trade-
off between the minimization of the risk of punishing the particular innocent per-
son and other values (which Tomlin calls the ‘overriding approach’).  
Tomlin claims that there is another path to acknowledging the subjective 
principle: any person that believes that the avoidance of wrongful convictions 
vastly outweighs the avoidance of wrongful acquittals should embrace this princi-
ple (the ‘outweighing approach’). This means that at least some consequentialists 
could embrace the subjective principle as well. This does not seem correct to me. 
As we will see shortly, there exists a possibility, at least theoretically, that relaxing 
the evidentiary standard may lead to a decrease in the global number of wrongful 
                                                                                                                                                    
but I will not elaborate on it here). In the notable words of Lawrence Tribe (1970), “guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt represents not a lawyer’s fumbling substitute for a specific percentage, but 
a standard that seeks to come as close to certainty as human knowledge allows – one that refuses 
to take a deliberate risk of punishing any innocent man.” A somewhat different account is given by 
Tadros (2006): “conviction is warranted only if knowledge that the defendant perpetrated the 
offence is demonstrated, and, we might add, demonstrated publicly. One reason why this might be 
so is that a criminal conviction will only achieve the kind of closure that the criminal trial aims at if 
no reasonable doubt remains about the guilt of the defendant.” 
17 See below in this section. 
18 Tomlin (2013). Technically, Tomlin refers at this point to the presumption of innocence, treating 
the high evidentiary threshold as a part of this principle. Since in this paper I focus mostly on the 
evidentiary standard, I will speak of the BARD standard instead.  
19 Ibidem. 
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convictions. This possibility has been neglected in the literature on the philosophy 
of criminal law. However, as long as it is not dealt with, it remains questionable 
whether the ‘outweighing approach’ may lead to the direct moral grounding of 
the BARD standard. Thus, it appears to me that only the retributivists can treat the 
BARD standard as directly morally grounded without any qualifications.  
When it comes to proponents of consequentialism,20 we can see that until 
recently many of them would find some arguments in favour of the high eviden-
tiary threshold in a criminal trial. Such consequentialists argued that the ratio of 
wrongful convictions to wrongful acquittals should be set in a way that minimizes 
the total social costs of legal errors.21 Since, as it has been argued for many centu-
ries, the social cost of wrongful conviction is, on average, significantly larger than 
the cost of wrongful acquittal (because a false conviction generates a huge 
deadweight loss due to loss of freedom and social stigma), society should be more 
interested in avoiding wrongful convictions than in preventing actual criminals 
from getting off the hook. Thus, the high evidentiary threshold in criminal law 
was supposed to be consistent with this ‘error-cost minimization’ framework.  
The error-cost minimization framework has recently come under fire. The 
main objection to it is the fact that, focusing on the ex post costs of adjudication, it 
totally neglects the effects that the evidentiary threshold has ex ante on the behav-
iour of both potential criminals and innocents. The higher the standard of proof is 
set, the lower, ceteris paribus, is the likelihood of conviction (and, subsequently, the 
expected punishment), so the lower is the deterrence effect, and vice versa. Howev-
er, the deterrence effect means here both deterring socially wasteful activities and 
chilling benign behaviour. Therefore, the social-welfare maximizing evidentiary 
threshold is supposed to maximize the difference between the benefit gained due 
to deterring wrongful activity and the cost of chilling benign activity. 
Louis Kaplow, who developed the most elaborate welfarist theory of bur-
den of proof to date,22 uses exactly this finding, claiming that the optimal thresh-
old occurs when the marginal benefit of deterring wrongful behaviour equals the 
marginal cost of chilling benign activity (i.e., respectively, both sides of the follow-
ing equation): 
                                                 
20 Due to space constraints, in the remaining part of this paper, under the head of ‘consequential-
ism’ I understand mostly normative economic (or welfarist) analysis of law. I believe this approach 
predominating in contemporary legal academia is representative for other branches of consequen-
tialism in most respects relevant for this paper. That means that important ideas about the eviden-
tiary threshold expressed by consequentialists who do not belong to the economic school, in par-
ticular Larry Laudan (2012), unfortunately will not be dealt with in this paper. 
21 Posner (2011). 
22 Kaplow (2012). 
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The first variable on both sides of the equation, i.e. the expected sanction, is de-
termined by three factors: the sanction, the probability of being charged, and the 
probability of being convicted conditional on being charged.23 The last of these 
factors is determined by the evidentiary threshold, so we can see that marginal 
changes in the evidentiary threshold enter the equation via the first variable on 
both sides.24 The second variable on both sides depicts how many acts are concen-
trated at the margin, so that multiplying first two variables gives us the number of 
acts deterred by a marginal change in the evidentiary threshold. Finally, the last 
variables, expressing the gain per deterred act, differ somewhat. For wrongful 
acts, it is calculated as the difference between the social cost of an act and whatev-
er private benefit a criminal enjoyed because of it. For benign activity, we assume 
that they do not generate any external cost (nor, for simplicity, any external bene-
fit), so we are interested only in the private gain of an innocent.  
Kaplow’s analysis, as presented so far, is applicable to any model of adjudi-
cation aimed at deterring wrongful behaviour. However, as we remember from 
the earlier discussion, criminal law is somewhat unique because criminal sanctions 
are socially costly, so the standard of proof in criminal trial is supposed to be 
higher than in other areas of law (because it is socially preferable to put a greater 
weight on preventing wrongful convictions). So, would the inclusion of social 
costs of wrongful convictions substantially change Kaplow’s model? Perhaps sur-
prisingly, the answer is not much. A quite shocking consequence of the model is 
the observation that increasing the standard of proof does not necessarily lead to 
a reduction in the number of wrongful convictions (actually, it may increase this 
number). To see it, let us notice that, according to the model, increasing the stand-
ard of proof leads to an increase in the number of benign acts. But that means that 
                                                 
23 Therefore raising the sanction or the probability of apprehension (being charged) are substitutes 
for lowering the evidentiary threshold. Kaplow’s model describes the interaction between these 
three parameters and their optimal levels. Due to space constraints, I will not deal with this issue 
here and will take the two former parameters as fixed. 
24 This is equivalent to what we have already said about the reverse relation between changes in 
the evidentiary threshold and the deterrence effect. 
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more innocents will be brought before the court. Increasing the standard implies 
that a smaller proportion of them will be convicted but, if their number increased 
enough, it is possible that, in absolute numbers, more of them will be punished. 
Therefore, without knowing parameters like the concentration of marginal benign 
acts it is impossible to predict whether a high evidentiary threshold will succeed 
in reducing the number of wrongful convictions. 
The basic lesson from Kaplow’s model is that the socially optimal eviden-
tiary threshold depends on some empirical parameters which are likely to be sig-
nificantly different for different categories of crimes. Thus, it is unreasonable to 
believe that the uniformly high evidentiary threshold in criminal law maximizes 
social welfare. In the welfarist framework, the threshold should be more diversi-
fied and, at least for some categories of crimes, it may be desirable to lower it be-
low the current BARD standard. Another lesson is that, at least in theory, some 
relaxation of the evidentiary standard may decrease the number of wrongful con-
victions. 
3. Proxy crimes 
The analysis presented in this paper thus far assumes that the high eviden-
tiary threshold (the BARD standard) is actually in place in the majority of modern 
criminal law systems. This assumption seems to be prima facie true, since in virtu-
ally all modern jurisdictions the high evidentiary threshold is explicitly stated in 
procedural criminal law. However, the real picture may be somewhat more compli-
cated. As it has been recently suggested,25 the actual evidential threshold may be 
effectively lowered (in comparison with the one specified in procedural law) if 
some institutions are introduced into substantive criminal law. An example of such 
an institution to be analysed in detail in this paper is a proxy crime. 
Although the notion of a proxy crime is quite recent in criminal law litera-
ture, the basic idea behind it can be traced as far back as the legal writings of Jere-
my Bentham.26 
The fourth class [of accessory offences] is composed of presumed offences [i.e. 
proxy crimes in our terminology], that is, of acts which are considered as proofs of 
an offence. They may be called evidentiary offences; acts injurious or otherwise in 
themselves, but furnishing a presumption of an offence committed.27 
                                                 
25 See e.g. Tadros, Tierney (2004); Teichman (forthcoming). 
26 Schauer (2003). 
27 Bentham (1864): 425. 
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This definition is almost identical to the one provided almost 200 years later by 
Richard H. McAdams: proxy crimes prohibit behaviour that, “while not inherently 
risking harm, stands in for behaviour that does risk harm.”28  
McAdams’ definition highlights two main characteristics of proxy crimes as 
they are understood in this paper. First, while criminalization is usually justified 
by the fact that criminalized behaviour causes harm or generates unacceptable 
level of risk of harm,29 this is not the case with proxy crimes, simply because they 
do not generate any substantial risk of harm.30 Second, proxy crimes are supposed to 
be in a significant correlation with some (supposedly prohibited) harmful behaviour.31 
Therefore, from the fact that an individual exhibits the suspicious behaviour de-
scribed by a proxy crime, we can infer, with some substantial likelihood, that she 
also commits the underlying crime.  
The third characteristic of proxy crimes, not explicitly stated in the defini-
tions provided above but commonly assumed in the literature, is the justification 
for their introduction: evidentiary problems. We encounter proxy crimes in situa-
tions in which the statute prohibiting an underlying crime contains elements that 
may be hard to prove in some circumstances. A corresponding proxy crime lacks 
these ‘hard-to-prove’ elements, which often makes it possible to convict the de-
fendant of a proxy crime in situations in which committing the underlying crime is 
hard to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.32 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 McAdams (2006). 
29 Becker (1968); Polinsky, Shavell (2000); Duff et al. (2007). 
30 Some authors use the term ‘proxy crime’ to denote basically any crime crafted on the basis of 
a statistical generalization (see e.g. Alexander, Kessler Ferzan (2013); so understood, the term 
‘proxy crime’ seems closely related to the notion of a ‘hybrid offence’ discussed by Duff (2007)). In 
this meaning, the prohibition of driving over 90 km per hour is a proxy offence because it denotes 
conduct which usually is unacceptably risky but is sometimes not. The meaning used here is much 
narrower and it only contains offences prohibiting behaviour that is always substantially harmless 
unless committed with the intent to commit also the underlying crime. 
31 Thereafter I will denote this harmful behaviour as ‘underlying crime’.  
32 A commonly known example (and frequently exploited in popular culture) of such a situation 
may be found in the history of the famous gangster Al Capone and his conviction for tax evasion. 
Of course, this example is not perfect (because tax evasion is generally harmful and deserves pros-
ecution on its own) but in this particular case tax evasion obviously served only as a proxy for the 
core of Capone’s criminal activity. 
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Table 1. Proxy crimes of type AB 
Following William J. Stuntz,33 we can think about two general ways in which 
a proxy crime may be designed. Let us start with an underlying crime whose de-
scription contains elements ABC, out of which at least one (C) may be hard to 
prove. Proxy crimes of the first type (AB) are created just by removing the trou-
bling element from the description of the underlying crime. The criminalization of 
accepting gifts by public officials is a good example of this type. The underlying 
crime (bribery) usually requires two elements to be proven: (A) a public official 
accepts some items of value, (B) this act is intended to influence the actions of the 
official. However, even in situations in which element A is easily observable, it 
may be prohibitively hard to prove element B (quid pro quo). Therefore, in many 
jurisdictions the standard prohibition of bribery is supplemented with a proxy 
crime prohibiting public officials from accepting any gifts, irrespective of the pres-
ence or lack of the quid pro quo element. In other words, it is assumed that the mere 
acceptance of a gift is already suspicious enough (correlating with bribery to a lev-
el which is high enough) that it should be punishable even when it is impossible to 
prove the quid pro quo element (however, as with other proxy crimes, acceptance of 
gifts tends to be punished more leniently than proper bribery). 
Table 2. Proxy crimes of type DEF 
Proxy crime Underlying crime 
Possession of drugs over the specified quantity Drug trafficking 
Driving with an open container of alcohol inside 
the car 
Driving under influence 
Bulk cash smuggling Money laundering 
The other type of proxy crime results when the legislature creates a com-
pletely new crime DEF, which denotes behaviour that is assumed to correlate with 
                                                 
33 Stuntz (2001). 
Proxy crime Underlying crime Omitted element 
Illegal gratuities  Bribery Quid pro quo 
Statutory rape Rape Lack of consent 
Carrying weapon inside 
an airport 
Attempt of terrorist attack Intent to carry out a terrorist 
attack 
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ABC, while being typically easier to prove. Harsh penalties for the mere posses-
sion of illegal drugs in quantities exceeding the statutory threshold can serve as an 
example of this type. Possession of drugs is not in any necessary way an indicator 
of participation in drug dealing schemes, nevertheless in many jurisdictions it is 
assumed that the possession of drugs over some threshold does correlate with drug 
dealing to a significant level. Thus, an individual caught with over 28 grams of 
cocaine should be punished harshly, even if there is nothing else to indicate that 
she is a drug dealer rather than just a person possessing drugs only for personal 
use.34 
As we saw, Jeremy Bentham in his legal writings used the label ‘presumed’ 
or ‘evidentiary offence’ to denote what we call here a proxy crime. The wording 
chosen by the English jurist is quite fortunate because it points out the role the 
proxy crimes played in his theory: they were nothing more than statutory pre-
sumptions, aiming at correcting possible shortcomings of the evidentiary infer-
ences taking place at a criminal trial.35 
The English legislature fearing that juries, too prone to lenity, would not see in 
these presumptions a certain proof of guilt, has thought fit to erect the Act which 
furnishes the presumption into a second offence, an offence distinct from every 
other. In those countries in which a perfect confidence is placed in the tribunals, 
these Acts may be arranged under their proper head, and be considered merely as 
presumptions, from which the court is to draw such inferences as the circumstanc-
es warrant.36 
So, according to Bentham, proxy crimes tend to be introduced when (1) there ex-
ists some pattern of suspicious behaviour that indicates with a very large degree of 
likelihood that a given individual has committed a given underlying crime but 
(2) there is uncertainty whether the court would see this pattern of behaviour as 
sufficient for meeting the BARD standard of proof, or, in other words, as evidence 
sufficient for conviction. Therefore, to avoid problems with meeting the standard, 
(3) the lawmaker decides to criminalize the suspicious pattern of behaviour itself, 
so that an individual exhibiting the suspicious behaviour may be convicted of the 
proxy crime even if otherwise she would not be convicted of the underlying crime 
because of insufficient evidence. 
                                                 
34 For the sake of argument, I am assuming here that personal use of drugs is not punishment- 
-worthy.  
35 For a good analysis of Bentham’s ideas in this regard, see Schauer (2003). 
36 Bentham (1864): 426. 
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This is enough to see that the main objective and actual result of proxy 
criminalization is to circumvent the high evidentiary threshold necessary for con-
victing the defendant of the underlying crime:37 if the defendant cannot be 
convicted of the underlying crime because of insufficient evidence but has exhibit-
ed the requisite suspicious behaviour, he can still be ‘proxy-convicted’.  
Therefore, from the perspective of a lawmaker willing to lower the standard 
of proof for a given crime, the introduction of a proxy crime is a substitute for an 
explicit or implicit change of procedural rules of evidence. To use an example: 
let us assume that the legislator wants to introduce a presumption that anybody 
possessing more than 28 grams of cocaine is involved in drug trafficking (even if 
there is no other evidence indicating that the person in question is involved in sell-
ing, distribution, or generally trading in cocaine). In this case there are two general 
ways to achieve this goal. First, it is possible to alter the rules of evidence so that 
the mere possession of large quantities of narcotics is sufficient for convicting 
a person of drug trafficking. Alternatively, the legislator may introduce a new 
proxy crime, so that possessing more than 28 grams of cocaine is a crime on its 
own. 
4. Desirability of proxy criminalization 
As mentioned before, consequentialists may find a relaxation of the eviden-
tiary threshold desirable in some situations, thus proxy criminalization (as a way 
of lowering the evidentiary threshold) may be in principle justified from the con-
sequentialist perspective.38 However, one may still wonder why the evidentiary 
threshold should be lowered by crafting new proxy crimes instead of explicitly 
lowering the threshold as stated in the procedural law, which seems to be a more 
natural way to do so. Some arguments showing why proxy criminalization may be 
a preferable solution have been proposed in the literature. 
The first argument stems from an observation that the correlation between 
suspicious behaviour and the respective underlying crime is hardly ever perfect, 
so that there are usually some individuals that exhibit the suspicious behaviour for 
a legitimate reason, without any intent to commit the underlying crime. The socie-
ty seems to have an interest in incentivizing such ‘innocents’ to refrain from the 
suspicious behaviour (first, because of the potential deadweight loss resulting 
                                                 
37 However, what is important from the viewpoint of traditional legal theory is the fact that the 
lowering of the standard of proof is achieved through manipulating substantive, not procedural, 
rules. 
38 Of course, the question whether actual instances of proxy crimes are optimal from the perspec-
tive of, for example, Kaplow’s welfarist model, remains to be answered empirically.  
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from punishing them as if they had committed the underlying crime and secondly 
because by exhibiting the suspicious behaviour innocents may trigger unneces-
sary, socially wasteful actions on the part of law enforcement). However, because 
innocents are obviously more likely to refrain from the suspicious behaviour if 
they are well informed about the possibility of being convicted, it seems likely that 
proxy criminalization tends to be superior precisely because it facilitates the ac-
quisition of information by innocents. 
To show this, let us once again use the cocaine example, in which the law-
maker wants to effectively prosecute drug trafficking. Imagine two extreme legal 
regulations: in the first one the mere possession of more than 28 grams of cocaine 
is proxy-criminalized; in the other one case law allows the court to infer drug traf-
ficking from the possession of a ‘large quantity of illegal drugs’. Further, assume 
that there are some ‘innocent’ (not involved in drug trafficking) consumers of 
drugs who tend to store large quantities of cocaine for personal use. These inno-
cents seem to be more likely to signal their innocence (by refraining from the sus-
picious behaviour, i.e. by limiting the quantity of cocaine in their possession) in 
the first situation. It seems to be the case because the statutory substantive law is 
more easily available than the case law and it tends to use less ambiguous distinc-
tions than the standard-like judge-made law, so it can be more easily absorbed by 
laypeople.39 It is an overlooked advantage of proxy crimes: when the underlying 
crime’s definition is vague and standard-like, supplementing it with a rule-like 
proxy crime may actually increase the legal certainty and provide innocents with 
better information on how they can avoid the risk of getting involved in a crimi-
nalized conduct.  
The second argument refers to the need of calibrating sanctions in accord-
ance with the strength of the evidence.40 Since the correlation between suspicious 
behaviour and the underlying crime is usually not perfect, lowering the standard 
of proof may lead to chilling the benign behaviour of innocents. To mitigate the 
chilling risk, punishment for suspicious behaviour should be lower than the one 
applied to individuals whose guilt for committing the crime has been proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Assuming the legislator is able to assess the strength of 
the correlation and the value lost because of the chilling effect, he can set the pun-
ishment for committing a proxy crime as adequately lower than the sanction for 
the underlying crime. Since sanctions for proxy crimes actually tend to be lower 
                                                 
39 Ehrlich, Posner (1974); Kaplow (1992, 1999). 
40 Teichman (forthcoming). 
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than sanctions for the underlying crime, we can assume that this goal is to some 
extent achieved in reality. 
Yet another argument points at the fact that proxy criminalization is social-
ly preferable to the explicit relaxation of evidentiary rules because it fits common 
moral beliefs and the expressive function of criminal law better than an explicit 
relaxation of procedural rules.41 The explicit incorporation of evidential uncertain-
ty (like in a hypothetical ruling saying that “the defendant was found 70%-guilty”) 
would undermine the belief that criminal law is an ultimate tool to be used only 
when there is knowledge of the guilt of a defendant. Luckily, under proxy criminali-
zation we are able to prove the guilt of an individual exhibiting a suspicious be-
haviour beyond a reasonable doubt (though it is the guilt of committing the proxy, 
not the underlying, crime), so that the useful fiction of criminal law as a realm of 
certainty can be retained. 
Finally, it may be argued that proxy criminalization is preferable in cases in 
which proving the underlying crime would require making use of circumstantial, 
as opposed to direct, evidence.42 There is literature documenting the propensity of 
legal decision-makers (both jurors and professional judges) to act under the influ-
ence of unreliable heuristics and cognitive biases when dealing with statistical ev-
idence.43 However, recent experimental studies have discovered an even more 
fundamental and troublesome phenomenon: anti-inference bias, i.e. aversion to-
wards basing liability on inferences from any circumstantial evidence.44 Thus, in 
cases where a proxy crime may be described in a clear-cut way, its introduction 
may allow legal decision-makers to determine their verdicts based on direct evi-
dence and to avoid possible mistakes stemming from suboptimal assessment of 
circumstantial, especially statistical, evidence.  
The attitude of retributivists towards proxy criminalization turns out to be 
somewhat more complex. Retributivism, as understood in this paper, would defi-
nitely object proxy criminalization if it resulted in punishing the innocent. How-
ever, it is far from uncontroversial whom we may consider innocent.  
On the one hand, it might seem that even a retributivist who sees the BARD 
standard as a directly morally grounded principle do not need to have any specific 
objections against proxy crimes. As long as the defendant is only convicted of 
a proxy crime if it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he has com-
                                                 
41 Ibidem. 
42 Zamir, Harlev, Ritov (2016/2017). 
43 See e.g. Teichman, Zamir (2015): sections 7 and 8 for a review of literature. 
44 Zamir, Ritov, Teichman (2014). 
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mitted an act fitting the statutory definition of a given proxy crime, there seems to 
be no interference with the BARD standard. Indeed, we would expect such a reac-
tion from criminal law scholars advocating the procedural reading of the presump-
tion of innocence principle and the BARD standard.45 In their opinion, the BARD 
standard belongs only to the realm of rules governing the criminal trial and it can-
not be used to assess any actions taking place outside the courtroom. In particular, 
it does not set any limit on the scope of legitimate criminalization. Even if the state 
effectively makes it easier to convict individuals by relaxing the statutory defini-
tions of offences, it does not, by itself, interfere with the BARD standard. The de-
fendant whose guilt of committing a proxy crime has been proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt cannot be considered ‘innocent’ in any relevant meaning of this 
word, thus proxy criminalization does not lead to the unacceptable punishment of 
innocents.  
However, on the other hand, the situation appears to be radically different 
if we adopt a more substantive reading of the presumption of innocence (and the 
BARD standard),46 claiming that the state is free to criminalize conduct only if 
there is a high degree of certainty that it will not lead to the punishment of inno-
cents (here understood as individuals, whose acts, even if criminalized, were not 
punishment-worthy47). Of course, proxy crimes become potentially illegitimate un-
der this reading. As long as the correlation between the underlying crime and the 
suspicious behaviour is not perfect, proxy criminalization would lead to the pun-
ishment of so-understood innocents.  
Whether the substantive reading of the presumption of innocence is justi-
fied remains a hotly debated issue in contemporary philosophy of criminal law. 
Nevertheless, it appears to me that this interpretation is more consistent with neg-
ative retributivism. As it was argued before,48 the importance of the presumption 
                                                 
45 Roberts (2005); Lippke (2016). 
46 See e.g. Tadros, Tierney (2004); Tomlin (2013). 
47 The term punishment-worthiness, as used by Tomlin (2013), is open to at least two interpreta-
tions. The moralistic interpretation [e.g. Duff (2005)] would imply that the legislator may criminal-
ize only a conduct that is actually immoral. The other interpretation, advocated by Tadros (2006), 
implies that the legislator is free to criminalize a conduct that they consider a public wrong (even if 
it is not actually immoral); what the legislator is not allowed to do, however, is to draft an offence 
in such a way that would lead to the punishment of individuals who have not committed what the 
legislator considers the public wrong in question (in other words, the legislator is not allowed to 
draft offences whose definitions are overinclusive). The differences between these two interpreta-
tions are by no means trivial; however, most proxy crimes (or at least most of the examples of 
proxy crimes presented in this paper) would be problematic under both interpretations, so I will 
not elaborate on this issue any further.  
48 See Section 2 of this paper. 
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of innocence (and the BARD standard) within the retributivist framework results 
from treating it as a principle that is directly morally grounded. The presumption 
of innocence is directly justified by the evil that would result from punishing the 
innocent. But then, if we agree that this kind of moral considerations justifies 
a strict decision criterion during the criminal trial, it would be misguided not to 
apply a similar criterion while deciding on the scope of criminalization.49 It is so 
because a decision with regard to the scope of criminalization is no less likely to 
result in the punishment of individuals who do not deserve to be punished than 
decisions made during the trial. Just as the court cannot impose the punishment 
unless it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is indeed 
guilty, so the legislator is not allowed to criminalize a given conduct unless it is 
certain beyond a reasonable doubt that engaging in this conduct is punishment- 
-worthy.50 
There is still one important issue missing in our discussion on retributivism 
and proxy criminalization: proxy crimes seem to fit well the traditional definition 
of mala prohibita (i.e. offenses that are “wrong only because prohibited by legisla-
tion”51) and there exists a substantial (even if inconclusive) literature aiming at 
reconciling the existence of mala prohibita with retributivism. Perhaps, then, proxy 
crimes can be easily justified by some of the proposed retributivist justifications 
for mala prohibita (or at least it can be concluded proxy crimes are not more incon-
sistent with retributivism than any other type of mala prohibita)? This seems 
somewhat dubious to me since there exists one significant difference between 
proxy crimes and typical examples of mala prohibita: the motivation behind their 
introduction. Let us recall that the basic reason behind any proxy crime is the fact 
that proving the underlying crime beyond a reasonable doubt may be problematic. 
A typical proxy crime would denote a conduct that is perfectly unwrongful if not 
for the fact that it suspiciously resembles some other criminalized act. Thus, a typ-
ical proxy offence is criminal only because some other act has been criminalized before. 
                                                 
49 Tomlin (2013). 
50 Such a conclusion is a result of what Tomlin (ibidem) calls Equivalence Thesis 1: “it can be as bad 
or worse to punish someone for something that they should not, in fact, be punished for (and did 
do), as it is to punish someone for something that they did not, in fact, do (but that is, in principle, 
punishment-worthy.” Another, somewhat more practically-oriented argument in favour of the 
substantive reading is offered by Tadros and Tierney (2004): if the presumption of innocence is 
supposed to serve as an individual’s shield against the state, then its protection would become 
totally illusory if the state were free to relax the evidentiary standard by enacting overinclusive 
offences.  
51 See Duff (2005): chapter 4.4, and literature discussed there.  
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Most retributivist attempts at justifying mala prohibita aim, in my opinion, to 
show that, even if a given act would not be morally wrongful absent any legal 
regulation, after the legal regulation is in place individuals have independent 
(other than avoiding criminal punishment) moral reasons not to engage in it.52 
That is not the case with proxy crimes, since basically the only reason individuals 
have not to engage in a proxy-criminalized conduct is not to raise suspicions of the 
criminal law enforcers, which is the same as saying that they do not have any 
moral reasons independent from the criminal law not to engage in this behav-
iour.53 
Negative retributivism accompanied by the substantive reading of the pre-
sumption of innocence is inconsistent with proxy criminalization as long as the 
latter is overinclusive54 (i.e. as long as it leads to the punishment of individuals 
who are not punishment-worthy). As I have tried to show in the preceding para-
graphs, such an interpretation of negative retributivism appears to be most plau-
sible and consistent. However, what is equally important for this paper, is that 
such an interpretation of negative retributivism may serve as an explanation for 
existing court judgments that put limits on the legitimate scope of proxy criminal-
ization. Indeed, court rulings in which proxy crimes are treated with utmost sus-
picion are numerous and may be found in many jurisdictions.55 In this paper, 
I will discuss in more detail just one of them, namely the U.S. Supreme Court case 
of Bajakaijan. 
In this case,56 the Supreme Court’s majority found the punishment of full 
forfeiture for the offence of bulk cash smuggling (understood here as a proxy 
                                                 
52 Be it: keeping a promise, solving coordination problems, or respecting rules of fair play; see 
Husak (2005) for a critical overview.  
53 For completeness, we should mention legalistic (as opposed to moralistic) retributivism: a claim 
that an individual engaging in a conduct prohibited by a duly enacted criminal statute deserves to 
be punished, simply because he has been given notice, irrespectively of the content of this statue. 
Following Husak (2005), I would argue that unrestricted legalistic retributivism cannot constitute 
a tenable moral criterion, simply because it is impossible to imagine a duly enacted criminal statute 
that would not be justifiable under unrestricted legalistic retributivism.  
54 Schauer (1991); Alexander, Kessler Felzan (2013). 
55 E.g. the New York Court of Appeals case of Bunis (9 N.Y.2d 1, 210 N.Y.S.2d 505, 172 N.E.2d 273 
1961) in which the criminalization of selling magazines or books without a front cover has been 
found unconstitutional, or a House of Lords ruling in Sheldrake v DPP ([2004] UKHL 43), in which 
two proxy crimes (being drunk in charge a car and being a member of a proscribed terrorist organ-
ization) were interpreted as imposing only an evidentiary burden on the defendant, or a European 
Court of Human Rights ruling in Salabiaku v. France (1988 13 EHRR 379), in which the Court set 
the limit on the possibility to convict the defendant of “possession of prohibited goods when pass-
ing through customs” in a situation in which the prosecution failed to prove that the defendant 
was guilty of drug trafficking. 
56 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). 
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crime supplementing the underlying crime of money laundering) is “grossly dis-
proportional” to the gravity of the offence. 
In Bajakaijan, the defendant was apprehended while trying to board a trans- 
-Atlantic flight with over 350,000 US dollars in cash hidden in a false-bottomed 
suitcase, which he had not disclosed in an appropriate declaration. It had not been 
proved that the funds were of any illegal origin (Bajakaijan claimed he had carried 
the money to repay a legitimate loan from his relatives in Syria), even if the behav-
iour of the defendant was generally suspicious and inconsistent. Still, in accord-
ance with the criminal statue, the custom authorities declared the whole amount 
subject to full forfeiture.  
The Supreme Court held that the harsh punishment of full forfeiture for the 
offence of bulk cash smuggling was addressed against actual money launders. 
Since it had not been proved that Bajakaijan was a money launderer, his act had 
been only a minor administrative offence,57 for which the harsh punishment 
would be grossly disproportional.58 
This ruling is based on an obvious observation that proxy criminalization is 
overinclusive: a proxy crime is intended to be addressed against individuals that 
have committed the underlying crime but in fact it includes all individuals 
that have engaged in the suspicious behaviour, including those who have not 
committed the underlying crime (‘innocents,’ as I call them here). So, the criminal-
                                                 
57 It may be argued that Bajakaijan is not a good example to be used in an analysis of proxy crimes, 
since the failure to report would be an offence anyway and the question to be decided by the Court 
was only whether the punishment was excessively harsh or not. But let us recall that in this paper 
I understand proxy criminalization as referring to two somewhat different situations: 1) a totally 
harmless conduct is criminalized; 2) a conduct that is harmful (or punishment-worthy) only to 
a small extent is sanctioned with a disproportional penalty. In the latter case, the harsh punishment 
is imposed not because of the intrinsic wrongfulness of the conduct but only because this conduct is 
suspicious from the viewpoint of some serious underlying crime. I agree that the second setting is 
a much less obvious example of proxy criminalization and may seem to be more readily justifiable 
form the retributivist perspective. However, let us remember that the main thesis of negative re-
tributivism states both that the innocent should not be punished and that the guilty should not be 
punished more than they deserve. There is no reason to treat the second constraint as less important, 
quite the opposite. In the words of Tomlin (2013), “[o]verpunishment mistakes can be just as seri-
ous, if not more so, than wrongful conviction mistakes”. This is clearly visible in these cases of 
proxy criminalization in which minor regulatory offences, which we would expect to be punished 
leniently, are punished as the serious crimes with which they are assumed to correlate. To refer to 
the current example: undeclared movement of cash looks like a minor administrative offence (so 
a person violating this law would expect a moderate penalty, comparable to penalties for similar 
offences consisting in failure to report some information; this is exactly the case in most contempo-
rary jurisdiction that criminalize bulk-cash smuggling) but in the US the punishment turns out to 
be unexpectedly harsh.  
58 Notice that the reasoning here is based on a (reasonable) assumption that bulk cash smuggling in 
itself is a rather harmless act. It is harmful only if it is a part of a money laundering (or tax evasion) 
scheme.  
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ization of bulk cash smuggling is addressed against money launderers (because it 
seems reasonable to assume that almost everybody who smuggles cash is a money 
launderer) but it includes also innocents, i.e. people who move cash for legitimate 
reasons and just forgot to fill out the required declaration. 
If taken literally, the majority opinion in Bajakaijan seems to say: the harsh 
punishment for the crime that Bajakaijan has committed (bulk cash smuggling) 
could be imposed only if it had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
was a money launderer. But notice that had it been proved that he was a money 
launder, the conviction of bulk cash smuggling would have been superfluous. 
Bulk cash smuggling, like any proxy crime, is employed exactly when it cannot be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the underly-
ing crime. And in the case of money laundering, a crime that is both lucrative and 
hard to detect, the introduction of proxy criminalization seems, at least intuitively, 
justifiable. However, a consequentialist analysis of this kind is missing from the 
majority option.59 It looks like the majority’s willingness to avoid any risk of pun-
ishing the innocent, no matter how small, clearly overrode any possible benefits 
associated with proxy-criminalizing money launderers. 
Yet another feature of this ruling points at its retributivist basis. The majori-
ty did not attempt in any way to assess how likely it was for an ‘innocent’ (i.e. 
a person not involved in money laundering) to commit the offence in question, or, 
in other words, how likely it was that somebody would fail to declare a movement 
of cash simply because she did not know she was supposed to or thought of it as 
a bureaucratic requirement of secondary importance. Thus, the majority did not 
seem to be concerned with the question of whether proxy criminalization was em-
pirically overinclusive in this case. For the majority, it was enough that the scope of 
criminalization was conceptually overinclusive, i.e. that there was not analytically 
necessary link between the definition of the proxy crime (bulk-cash smuggling) 
and the wrong that would justify the harsh punishment (i.e. money laundering). 
This requirement of an analytical correspondence between the description of the 
criminalized conduct and the wrong that justifies the criminalization was very 
much stressed by the retributivist proponents of the substantive reading of the 
presumption of innocence, whose views we discussed earlier.60 
                                                 
59 However, consequentialist arguments appear in a dissent by Justice Kennedy. 
60 Tomlin (2013); Tadros, Tierney (2004). 
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5. Conclusions 
As it has been argued in this paper, proxy crimes, while in principle justifi-
able from the consequentialist perspective, are very much more troublesome for 
retributivism (or at least for what I find to be the most plausible interpretation of 
retributivism). As I attempted to demonstrate in the preceding section using the 
example of Bajakaijan, judicial rulings that set limits on the scope of proxy crimi-
nalization are best understood as an expression of these retributivist views.  
However, such an outcome may be troubling for a number of reasons. First, 
while proxy criminalization remains controversial (often rightly so) in newly de-
veloped areas of criminal law (such as anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist 
regulations), remember that many examples of proxy crimes, including some re-
ferred to in this paper, have been present in criminal codes for many years and do 
not seem to be particularly frowned upon by retributivists. The question why the-
se more traditional proxy crimes do not trigger that much controversy is yet to be 
answered satisfactorily. 
Another issue is whether retributivist arguments in favour of the uniformly 
high evidentiary threshold should bother us at all. As we established above, if re-
tributivism generates an argument in favour of the high threshold, it is because it 
endorses an agent-relative norm, requiring knowledge of guilt in order to impose 
the punishment in particular cases, while not caring that much about the overall 
number of wrongful convictions the criminal law system generates. Of course, for 
consequentialists such an attitude is absurd: if there is something morally relevant, 
it is exactly the overall number of wrongful convictions. As we saw while analys-
ing Kaplow’s model, there is at least a theoretical possibility that relaxing the evi-
dentiary threshold may decrease the number of wrongful convictions61 but for neg-
ative retributivists it would not suffice as an argument in favour of lowering the 
threshold. To refer to an intuitively compelling class of cases: when the underlying 
crime is vague and standard-like (thus possibly causing confusion among indi-
viduals) supplementing it with a more rule-like proxy crime may increase the cer-
tainty of law and decrease the number of wrongful convictions. However, even if 
that would be the case, many retributivists would object to such proxy crimes pre-
cisely on the grounds of protecting the innocent.  
In any case, the deontological asymmetry between extreme prudence in 
dealing with the ‘particular’ risk of punishing the innocent and disregarding the 
task of mitigating the ‘global’ risk seems somewhat troubling while being an im-
                                                 
61 Of course, consequentialists have to take other (beneficial or detrimental) effects of lowering the 
threshold into account before making any recommendation. 
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portant part of negative retributivist theories of criminal law. It is the most likely 
reason for the general support that the high evidentiary standard in criminal law 
enjoys. However, as it was argued in this paper, the existence of proxy crimes is 
one example which shows that the effective evidentiary threshold in contempo-
rary legal systems is oftentimes lower than the one officially specified in the pro-
cedural law. Thus, the dispute between retributivism and consequentialism in the 
context of dealing with the risk of punishing the innocent is of more practical rele-
vance than it is usually acknowledged. 
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